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Decentralized Systems Aren't

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Below the fold is the text of a talk I gave to Berkeley's Information Systems Seminar exploring the history of attempts to build decentralized systems and why so many of them end up centralized.

As usual, you don't need to take notes. The text of my talk with links to the sources will go up at blog.dshr.org after this seminar.

Why Decentralize?

Tweets by language
This is a map of the location of tweets in Europe, colored by language. It vividly shows the contrast between a centralized society and more decentralized ones. I hope we can agree as to which one we'd prefer to live in.

The platonic ideal of a decentralized system has many advantages over a centralized one performing the same functions:
  1. It can be more resilient to failures and attacks.
  2. It can resist acquisition and the consequent enshittification.
  3. It can scale better.
  4. It has the economic advantage that it is hard to compare the total system cost with the benefits it provides because the cost is diffused across many independent budgets.

Why Not Decentralize?

But history shows that this platonic ideal is unachieveable because systems decentralization isn't binary and systems that aim to be at the decentralized end of the spectrum suffer four major problems:
  1. Their advantages come with significant additional monetary and operational costs.
  2. Their user experience is worse, being more complex, slower and less predictable.
  3. They are in practice only as decentralized as the least decentralized layer in the stack.
  4. They exhibit emergent behaviors that drive centralization.

What Does "Decentralization" Mean?

Source
In Gini Coefficients Of Cryptocurrencies I discussed various ways to measure decentralization. Because decentralization applies at each layer of a system's stack, it is necessary to measure each of the subsystem individually. In 2017's Quantifying Decentralization Srinivasan and Lee identified a set of subsystems for public blockchains, and measured them using their proposed "Nakamoto Coefficient":
The Nakamoto coefficient is the number of units in a subsystem you need to control 51% of that subsystem.
SubsystemBitcoinEthereum
Mining53
Client11
Developer52
Exchange55
Node34
Owner45672
Their table of the contemporary Nakamoto coefficients for Bitcoin and Ethereum makes the case that they were only minimally decentralized.

Blockchains exemplify a more rigorous way to assess decentralization; to ask whether a node can join the network autonomously, or whether it must obtain permission to join. If the system is "permissioned" it cannot be decentralized, it is centralized around the permission-granting authority. Truly decentralized systems must be "permissionless". My title is wrong; the talk is mostly about permissionless systems, not about the permssioned systems that claim to be decentralized but clearly aren't.

TCP/IP

IBM Cabling System
The world has been on a decades-long series of experiments trying to build successful decentralized systems marked almost entirely by failure. Forty years ago I played a small part in one of the first of these experiments. I was working at Carnegie-Mellon's Information Technology Center on the Andrew Project, one of three pioneering efforts in campus networking. The others were at Brown and MIT. It was generously funded by IBM, who were covering the campus with the massively over-engineered "IBM Cabling System". They really wanted these wires to carry IBM's Token Ring network supporting IBM's System Network Architecture (SNA). SNA was competing with the telco's X.25 and DARPA's IP stack for the future of networking, and it wasn't clear which would win. But the three campus projects were adamant that their networks would run IP, largely because it was non-proprietary and far less centralized.

Domain Name System

Source
It is true that TCP/IP now dominates the bottom layers of the stack, but the common complaint is that the systems layered on it are excessively centralized. DNS is centralized around the root servers and IANA's (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority) management of top-level DNS domains and the global IP and AS spaces. They are the Internet's permission-granting authority. To scale, they have delegated management of sub-spaces to others, but the fundamental centralization remains. The Web is so centralized around the tech giants that there is an entire decentralized web movement. E-mail is increasingly centralized around a few major providers making life for those like me who run their own e-mail servers more and more difficult.

The basis of TCP/IP is the end-to-end principle, that to the extent possible network nodes communicate directly with each other, not relying on functions in the infrastructure. So why the need for root servers and IANA? It is because nodes need some way to find each other, and the list of root servers' IP addresses provides a key into the hierarchical structure of DNS.

This illustrates the important point that a system is only as decentralized as the least decentralized layer in its stack.

LOCKSS

Fifteen years on from CMU when Vicky Reich and I started the LOCKSS program we needed a highly resilient system to preserve library materials, so the advantages of decentralization loomed large. In particular, we realized that:
  • A centralized system would provide an attractive target for litigation by the publisher oligopoly.
  • The paper library system already formed a decentralized, permissionless network.
Our idea was to build a permissionless peer-to-peer system in which libraries would hold copies of their subscription content and model the paper inter-library loan and copy system to repair any loss or damage to them. To detect loss or damage the nodes would vote on the hash of the content. We needed to defend against a "Sybil attack", in which a bad guy wishing to change some content would create enough nodes under his control to win the votes on it. Our initial attempts at designing a protocol were flawed, but we eventually won a "Best Paper" award at the 2003 SOSP conference for a protocol that used proof-of-work (PoW) as a way of making running a node expensive enough to deter Sybil attacks. An honest library need only run one node, the bad guy had to run more than the total of the honest libraries, so would pay many times the per-library cost.

Why LOCKSS Centralized

  • Software monoculture
  • Centralized development
  • Permissioning ensures funding
  • Big publishers hated decentralization
Although the LOCKSS technology was designed and implemented to be permissionless, there were a number of reasons why it turned out much less decentralized than we hoped:
  • Although we always paid a lot of attention to the security of LOCKSS boxes, we understood that a software monoculture was vulnerable to software supply chain attacks. So we designed a very simple protocol hoping that there would be multiple implementations. But it turned out that the things that a LOCKSS box needed to do other than handling the protocol were quite complex, so despite our best efforts we ended up with a software monoculture.
  • We hoped that by using the BSD open-source license we would create a diverse community of developers, but we over-estimated the expertise and the resources of the library community, so Stanford provided the overwhelming majority of the programming effort.
  • The program got started with small grants from Michael Lesk at NSF, then subsequently major grants from the NSF, Sun Microsystems and Don Waters at the Mellon Foundation. But Don was clear that grant funding could not provide the long-term sustainability needed for digital preservation. So he provided a matching grant to fund the transition to being funded by the system's users. This also transitioned the system to being permissioned, as a way to ensure the users paid.
  • Although many small and open-access publishers were happy to allow LOCKSS to preserve their content, the oligopoly publishers never were. Eventually they funded a completely closed network of a dozen huge systems at major libraries around the world called CLOCKSS. This is merely the biggest of a number of closed, private LOCKSS networks that were established to serve specific genres of content, such as government documents.

Gossip Protocols

If LOCKSS was to be permissionless there could be no equivalent of DNS, so how did a new node find other nodes to vote with?

A gossip protocol or epidemic protocol is a procedure or process of computer peer-to-peer communication that is based on the way epidemics spread. Some distributed systems use peer-to-peer gossip to ensure that data is disseminated to all members of a group. Some ad-hoc networks have no central registry and the only way to spread common data is to rely on each member to pass it along to their neighbors.
Wikipedia

Suppose you have a decentralized network with thousands of nodes that can join and leave whenever they want, and you want to send a message to all the current nodes. This might be because they are maintaining a shared state, or to ask a question that a subset might be able to answer. You don't want to enumerate the nodes, because it would be costly in time and network traffic, and because the answer might be out-of-date by the time you got it. And even if you did sending messages individually to the thousands of nodes would be expensive. This is what IP multicast was for, but it doesn't work well in practice. So you build multicast on top of IP using a Gossip protocol.

Each node knows a few other nodes. The first time it receives a message it forwards it to them, along with the names of some of the nodes it knows. As the alternate name of "epidemic protocol" suggests, this is a remarkably effective mechanism. All that a new node needs in order to join is for the network to publish a few "bootstrap nodes", similar to the way an Internet node accesses DNS by having the set of root servers wired in. But this bootstrap mechanism is inevitably centralized.

The LOCKSS nodes used a gossip protocol to communicate, so in theory all a library needed to join in was to know another library running a node. In the world of academic libraries this didn't seem like a problem. It turned out that the bootstrap node all the libraries knew was Stanford, the place they got the software and the support. So just like DNS, the root identity was effectively wired-in.

Bitcoin

The network timestamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as proof of the sequence of events witnessed, but proof that it came from the largest pool of CPU power. As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not cooperating to attack the network, they'll generate the longest chain and outpace attackers.
Satoshi Nakamoto

Fast forward another ten years and Satoshi Nakamoto published Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, a ledger implemented as a chain of blocks containing transactions. Like LOCKSS, the system needed a Sybil-proof way to achieve consensus, in his case on the set of transactions in the next block to be added to the chain. Unlike LOCKSS, where nodes voted in single-phase elections, Nakamoto implemented a three-phase selection mechanism:
  1. One node is selected from the network using Proof-of-Work. It is the first node to guess a nonce that made the hash of the block have the required number of leading zeros.
  2. The selected node proposes the content of the next block via the gossip network.
  3. The "longest chain rule", Nakamoto's most important contribution, ensures that the network achieves consensus on the block proposed by the selected node.

Increasing Returns to Scale

Source
More than a decade earlier, W. Brian Arthur had published Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy explaining how the very strong economies of scale inherent to technology markets led to them being monopolized. Consider a new market opened up by a technological development. Several startups enter, for random reasons one gets bigger then the others, economies of scale make it more profitable and network effects make it more attractive to new customers, so this feedback loop drives it to out-compete the others.

The application to the Bitcoin network starts with this observation. The whole point of the Bitcoin protocol is to make running a miner, a node in the network, costly. The security of the system depends upon making an attack more costly to mount than it would gain. Miners need to defray the costs the system imposes in terms of power, hardware, bandwidth, staff and so on. Thus the protocol rewards miners with newly minted Bitcoin for winning the race for the next block.

Bitcoin Economics

Nakamoto's vision of the network was of many nodes of roughly equal power,"one CPU one vote". This has two scaling problems:
  • The target block time is 10 minutes, so in a network of 600 equal nodes the average time between rewards is 100 hours, or about 4 days. But in a network of 600,000 equal nodes it is about 4,000 days or about 11 years. In such a network the average node will never gain a reward before it is obsolete.
  • Moore's law means that over timescales of years the nodes are not equal, even if they are all CPUs. But shortly after Bitcoin launched, miners figured out that GPUs were much better mining rigs than CPUs, and later that mining ASICs were even better. Thus the miner's investment in hardware has only a short time to return a profit.
Mining Pools 02/27/23
The result was the formation of mining pools, allowing miners to contribute their power to a single huge node and trade their small chance of an infrequent large reward for a frequent flow of a small share of the node's rewards. But economies of scale applied even below the level of pools. A miner who could fill a warehouse with mining rigs or who was able to steal electricity would have much lower costs than a smaller miner. Thus they would not merely get more of the pool's block rewards, but they would keep more of them as profit. The success of this idea led to GHash.io's single node controlling the Bitcoin network with over 51% of the mining power. Most of it was from warehouses full of mining rigs.

The block rewards inflate the currency, currently by about $100M/day. This plus fees that can reach $23M/day, is the cost to run a system that currently processes 400K transactions/day, or over $250 per transaction plus up to $57 per transaction in fees. Lets talk about the excess costs of decentralization!

Like most permissionless networks, Bitcoin nodes communicate using a gossip protocol. So just like LOCKSS boxes, they need to know one or more bootstrap nodes in order to join the network, just like DNS and LOCKSS.
In Bitcoin Core, the canonical Bitcoin implementation, these bootstrap nodes are hard-coded as trusted DNS servers maintained by the core developers.
Haseeb Qureshi, Bitcoin's P2P Network
There are also fall-back nodes in case of DNS failure encoded in chainparamsseeds.h:
/**
 * List of fixed seed nodes for the bitcoin network
 * AUTOGENERATED by contrib/seeds/generate-seeds.py
 *
 * Each line contains a BIP155 serialized (networkID, addr, port) tuple.
 */

Economies of Scale in Peer-to-Peer Networks

Source
Fast forward another five years. Vicky Reich and I were driving North in my RX-7 for a long weekend at the Mendocino Hotel. On US101 before the driving got interesting on CA128 I was thinking about the recent period during which the GHash.io mining pool controlled 51% of Bitcoin's mining power.

I suddenly realized that this centralization wasn't something about Bitcoin, or LOCKSS for that matter. It was an inevitable result of economic forces generic to all peer-to-peer systems. So I spent much of the weekend sitting in one of the hotel's luxurious houses writing Economies of Scale in Peer-to-Peer Networks.

My insight was that the need to make an attack expensive wasn't something about Bitcoin, any permissionless peer-to-peer network would have the same need. In each case the lack of a root of trust meant that security was linear in cost, not exponential as with, for example, systems using encryption based upon a certificate authority. Thus any successful decentralized peer-to-peer network would need to reimburse nodes for the costs they incurred. How can the nodes' costs be reimbursed?:
There is no central authority capable of collecting funds from users and distributing them to the miners in proportion to these efforts. Thus miners' reimbursement must be generated organically by the blockchain itself; a permissionless blockchain needs a cryptocurrency to be secure.
And thus any successful permissionless network would be subject to the centralizing force of economies of scale.

Cryptocurrencies

ETH miners 11/2/20
There have been many attempts to create alternatives to Bitcoin, but of the current total "market cap" of around $2.5T Bitcoin and Ethereum represent $1.75T or 70%. The top 10 "decentralized" coins represent $1.92T, or 77%, so you can see that the coin market is dominated by just two coins. Adding in the top 5 coins that don't even claim to be decentralized gets you to 87% of the total "market cap".

The fact that the coins ranked 3, 6 and 7 by "market cap" don't even claim to be decentralized shows that decentralization is irrelevant to cryptocurrency users. Numbers 3 and 7 are stablecoins with a combined "market cap" of $134B. The largest stablecoin that claims to be decentralized is DAI, ranked at 24 with a "market cap" of $5B. Launching a new currency by claiming better, more decentralized technology than Bitcoin or Ethereum is pointless, as examples such as Chia, now ranked #182, demonstrate. Users care about liquidity, not about technology.

The holders of coins show a similar concentration, the Gini Coefficients Of Cryptocurrencies are extreme.

Ethereum's Merge

ETH Stakes 05/22/23
Ethereum made a praiseworthy effort to reduce their environmental impact by switching from Proof-of-Work to Proof-of-Stake and, in an impressive feat of software engineering, managed a smooth transition. The transition to Proof-of-Stake did in fact greatly reduce the Ethereum network's power consumption. Some fraction of the previous mining power was redirected to mine other Proof-of-Work coins, so the effect on the power consumption of cryptocurrencies as a whole was less significant. But it didn't reduce centralization, as the contrast between the before and after pie-charts shows.

Ethereum Validators

Time in proof-of-stake Ethereum is divided into slots (12 seconds) and epochs (32 slots). One validator is randomly selected to be a block proposer in every slot. This validator is responsible for creating a new block and sending it out to other nodes on the network. Also in every slot, a committee of validators is randomly chosen, whose votes are used to determine the validity of the block being proposed. Dividing the validator set up into committees is important for keeping the network load manageable. Committees divide up the validator set so that every active validator attests in every epoch, but not in every slot.
PROOF-OF-STAKE (POS)
Ethereum's consensus mechanism is vastly more complex than Bitcoin's, but it shares the same three-phase structure. In essence, this is how it works. To take part, a node must stake, or escrow, more than a minimum amount of the cryptocurrency,then:
  1. A "smart contract" uses a pseudo-random algorithm to select one node and a "committee" of other nodes with probabilities based on the nodes' stakes.
  2. The one node proposes the content of the next block.
  3. The "committee" of other validator nodes vote to approve the block, leading to consensus.
Just as Bitcoin and LOCKSS share Proof-of-Work, Ethereum's Proof-of-Stake and LOCKSS share another technique, voting by a random subset of the electorate. In LOCKSS the goal of this randomization was not just "keeping the network load manageable", but also making life hard for the bad guy. To avoid detection, the bad guy needed to vote only in polls where he controlled a large majority of the random subset of the nodes. This was something it was hard for him to know. I'm not clear whether the same thing applies to Ethereum.

Like Bitcoin, the nodes taking part in consensus gain a block reward currently running at $2.75M/day and fees running about $26M/day. This is the cost to run a distributed computer 1/5000 as powerful as a Raspberry Pi.

Validator Centralization

The prospect of a US approval of Ether exchange-traded funds threatens to exacerbate the Ethereum ecosystem’s concentration problem by keeping staked tokens in the hands of a few providers, S&P Global warns.
...
Coinbase Global Inc. is already the second-largest validator ... controlling about 14% of staked Ether. The top provider, Lido, controls 31.7% of the staked tokens,
...
US institutions issuing Ether-staking ETFs are more likely to pick an institutional digital asset custodian, such as Coinbase, while side-stepping decentralized protocols such as Lido. That represents a growing concentration risk if Coinbase takes a significant share of staked ether, the analysts wrote.

Coinbase is already a staking provider for three of the four largest ether-staking ETFs outside the US, they wrote. For the recently approved Bitcoin ETF, Coinbase was the most popular choice of crypto custodian by issuers. The company safekeeps about 90% of the roughly $37 billion in Bitcoin ETF assets, chief executive officer Brian Armstrong said
Yueqi Yang, Ether ETF Applications Spur S&P Warning on Concentration Risks
A system in which those with lots of money make lots more money but those with a little money pay those with a lot, and which has large economies of scale, might be expected to suffer centralization. As the pie-chart shows, this is what happened. In particular, exchanges hold large amounts of Ethereum on behalf of their customers, and they naturally stake it to earn income. The top two validators, the Lido pool and the Coinbase exchange, have 46.1% of the stake, and the top five have 56.7%.

Producer Centralization

Producers 03/18/24
The concentration is worse for block producers. The chart shows the top producer is generating 47.4% of the blocks and gaining 56.6% of the rewards.

Olga Kharif and Isabelle Lee report that these concentrations are a major focus of the SEC's consideration of Ethereum spot ETFs:
In its solicitations for public comments on the proposed spot Ether ETFs, the SEC asked, “Are there particular features related to ether and its ecosystem, including its proof of stake consensus mechanism and concentration of control or influence by a few individuals or entities, that raise unique concerns about ether’s susceptibility to fraud and manipulation?”

Software Centralization

Source
There is an even bigger problem for Ethereum. The software that validators run is close to a monoculture. Two of the minor players have recently suffered bugs that took them off-line, as Sam Kessler reports in Bug That Took Down 8% of Ethereum's Validators Sparks Worries About Even Bigger Outage:
A bug in Ethereum's Nethermind client software – used by validators of the blockchain to interact with the network – knocked out a chunk of the chain's key operators on Sunday.
...
Nethermind powers around 8% of the validators that operate Ethereum, and this weekend's bug was critical enough to pull those validators offline. ... the Nethermind incident followed a similar outage earlier in January that impacted Besu, the client software behind around 5% of Ethereum's validators.
...
Around 85% of Ethereum's validators are currently powered by Geth, and the recent outages to smaller execution clients have renewed concerns that Geth's dominant market position could pose grave consequences if there were ever issues with its programming.
...
Cygaar cited data from the website execution-diversity.info noting that popular crypto exchanges like Coinbase, Binance and Kraken all rely on Geth to run their staking services. "Users who are staked in protocols that run Geth would lose their ETH" in the event of a critical issue," Cygaar wrote.
The fundamental problem is that most layers in the software stack are highly concentrated, starting with the three operating systems. Network effects and economies of sclae apply at every layer. Remember "no-one ever gets fired for buying IBM"? At the Ethereum layer, it is "no-one ever gets fired using Geth" because, if there was ever a big problem with Geth, the blame would be so widely shared.

The Decentralized Web

One mystery was why venture capitalists like Andreesen Horwitz, normally so insistent on establishing wildly profitable monopolies, were so keen on the idea of a Web 3 implemented as "decentralized apps" (dApps) running on blockchains like Ethereum. Moxie Marlinspike revealed the reason:
companies have emerged that sell API access to an ethereum node they run as a service, along with providing analytics, enhanced APIs they’ve built on top of the default ethereum APIs, and access to historical transactions. Which sounds… familiar. At this point, there are basically two companies. Almost all dApps use either Infura or Alchemy in order to interact with the blockchain. In fact, even when you connect a wallet like MetaMask to a dApp, and the dApp interacts with the blockchain via your wallet, MetaMask is just making calls to Infura!
Providing a viable user experience when interacting with blockchains is a market with economies of scale and network effects, so it has centralized.

It Isn't About The Technology

What is the centralization that decentralized Web advocates are reacting against? Clearly, it is the domination of the Web by the FANG (Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, Google) and a few other large companies such as the cable oligopoly.

These companies came to dominate the Web for economic not technological reasons. The Web, like other technology markets, has very large increasing returns to scale (network effects, duh!). These companies build centralized systems using technology that isn't inherently centralized but which has increasing returns to scale. It is the increasing returns to scale that drive the centralization.

Source
The four FANG companies last year had a combined free cash flow of $159.7B. I know of no decentralized Web effort that has a viable business model. This isn't surprising, since they are focused on developing technology not a business model. This means they pose no threat to the FANG. Consider that, despite Elon Musk's attempts to make it unusable and the availability of federated alternatives such as Mastodon, Twitter retains the vast bulk of its user base. But as I explained in Competition-proofing, if they ever did pose a threat, in the current state of anti-trust the FANGs would just buy them. In 2018 I wrote in It Isn't About The Technology:
If a decentralized Web doesn't achieve mass participation, nothing has really changed. If it does, someone will have figured out how to leverage antitrust to enable it. And someone will have designed a technical infrastructure that fit with and built on that discovery, not a technical infrastructure designed to scratch the itches of technologists.
I think this is still the situation.

BitTorrent

Seven years ago I wrote:
Unless decentralized technologies specifically address the issue of how to avoid increasing returns to scale they will not, of themselves, fix this economic problem. Their increasing returns to scale will drive layering centralized businesses on top of decentralized infrastructure, replicating the problem we face now, just on different infrastructure.
Source
The only way that has worked in practice to avoid increasing returns to scale is not to reimburse nodes for their costs, but to require them to be run as a public service. The example we have of avoiding centralization in this way is Bram Cohen's BitTorrent, it is the exception that proves the rule. The network doesn't reward nodes for hosting content, but many sites find it a convenient way to distribute content. The network doesn't need consensus, thus despite being permissionless it isn't vulnerable to a Sybil attack. Users have to trust that the tracker correctly describes its content, so there are other possible attacks. But if we look at the content layer, it is still centralized. The vast majority of the content is at a few large sites like The Pirate Bay.

Blockchains

In 2022 DARPA funded a large team from the Trail of Bits cybersecurity company to publish a report entitled Are Blockchains Decentralized? which conformed to Betteridge's Law by concluding "No":
Every widely used blockchain has a privileged set of entities that can modify the semantics of the blockchain to potentially change past transactions.
The "privileged set of entities" must at least include the developers and maintainers of the software, because:
The challenge with using a blockchain is that one has to either (a) accept its immutability and trust that its programmers did not introduce a bug, or (b) permit upgradeable contracts or off-chain code that share the same trust issues as a centralized approach.
Source
The gossip network underlying Bitcoin has centralized in two ways. First:
A dense, possibly non-scale-free, subnetwork of Bitcoin nodes appears to be largely responsible for reaching consensus and communicating with miners—the vast majority of nodes do not meaningfully contribute to the health of the network.
And second:
Of all Bitcoin traffic, 60% traverses just three ISPs.
Source
Trail of Bits found remarkable vulnerabilities to internal or external supply chain attacks because:
The Ethereum ecosystem has a significant amount of code reuse: 90% of recently deployed Ethereum smart contracts are at least 56% similar to each other.
The risk isn't confined to individual ecosystems, it is generic to the entire cryptosphere because, as the chart shows, the code reuse spans across blockchains to such an extent that Ethereum's Geth shares 90% of its code with Bitcoin Core.

Decentralized Finance

Source
I mentioned Moxie Marlinspike's My first impressions of web3 showing that dApps all used Infura or Alchemy. Many of them implement "decentralized finance" (DeFi), and much research shows this layer has centralized. Prof. Hilary Allen's DeFi: Shadow Banking 2.0? concludes:
TL;DR: DeFi is neither decentralized, nor very good finance, so regulators should have no qualms about clamping down on it to protect the stability of our financial system and broader economy.
DeFi risks and the decentralisation illusion by Sirio Aramonte, Wenqian Huang and Andreas Schrimpf of the Bank for International Settlements similarly conclude:
While the main vision of DeFi’s proponents is intermediation without centralised entities, we argue that some form of centralisation is inevitable. As such, there is a “decentralisation illusion”. First and foremost, centralised governance is needed to take strategic and operational decisions. In addition, some features in DeFi, notably the consensus mechanism, favour a concentration of power.
ProtocolRevenueMarket
 $MShare %
Lido30455.2
Uniswap V35510.0
Maker DAO488.7
AAVE V3244.4
Top 4 78.2
Venus183.3
GMX142.5
Rari Fuse142.5
Rocket Pool142.5
Pancake Swap AMM V3132.4
Compound V2132.4
Morpho Aave V2101.8
Goldfinch91.6
Aura Finance81.5
Yearn Finance71.3
Stargate50.9
Total551 
Muyao Shen writes in DeFi Is Becoming Less Competitive a Year After FTX’s Collapse Battered Crypto that:
Based on the [Herfindahl-Hirschman Index], the most competition exists between decentralized finance exchanges, with the top four venues holding about 54% of total market share. Other categories including decentralized derivatives exchanges, DeFi lenders, and liquid staking, are much less competitive. For example, the top four liquid staking projects hold about 90% of total market share in that category,
Based on data on 180 days of revenue of DeFI projects from Shen's article, I compiled this table, showing that the top project, Lido, had 55% of the revenue, the top two had 2/3, and the top four projects had 78%. This is clearly a highly concentrated market, typical of cryptocurrency markets in general.

Federation

Source
The alternative to decentralization that is currently popular, especially in social media, is federation. Instead of forming a single system, federation allows many centralized subsystems to interoperate. Examples include BlueSky, Threads and Mastodon. Federation does offer significant advantages, including the opportunity for competition in the policies offered, and the ability for users to migrate to services they find more congenial.

How attractive are these advantages? The first bar chart shows worldwide web traffic to social media sites. Every single one of these sites is centralized, even the barely visible ones like Nextdoor. Note that Meta owns 3 of the top 4, with about 5 times the traffic of Twitter.

Source
The second bar chart shows monthly active users (MAUs) on mobile devices in the US. This one does have two barely visible systems that are intended eventually to be federated, Threads and Bluesky. Despite the opportunity provided by Elon Musk, the federated competitors have had minimal impact:
That leaves Mastodon with a total of 1.8 million monthly active users at present, an increase of 5% month-over-month and 10,000 servers, up 12%
In terms of monthly active users, Twitter claims 528M, Threads claims 130M, Bluesky claims 5.2M and Mastodon claims 1.8M. Note that the only federate-able one with significant market share is owned by the company that owns 3 of the top 4 centralized systems. Facebook claims 3,000M MAU, Instagram claims 2,000M MAU, and WhatsApp claims 2,000 MAU. Thus Threads is about 3% of Facebook alone, so not significant in Meta's overall business. It may be early days yet, but federated social media have a long way to go before they have significant market share.

Summary

Radia Perlman's answer to the question of what exactly you get in return for the decentralization provided by the enormous resource cost of blockchain technologies is:
a ledger agreed upon by consensus of thousands of anonymous entities, none of which can be held responsible or be shut down by some malevolent government
This is what the blockchain advocates want you to think, but as Vitalik Buterin, inventor of Ethereum pointed out in The Meaning of Decentralization:
In the case of blockchain protocols, the mathematical and economic reasoning behind the safety of the consensus often relies crucially on the uncoordinated choice model, or the assumption that the game consists of many small actors that make decisions independently. If any one actor gets more than 1/3 of the mining power in a proof of work system, they can gain outsized profits by selfish-mining. However, can we really say that the uncoordinated choice model is realistic when 90% of the Bitcoin network’s mining power is well-coordinated enough to show up together at the same conference?
As we have seen, in practice it just isn't true that "the game consists of many small actors that make decisions independently" or "thousands of anonymous entities". Even if you could prove that there were "thousands of anonymous entities", there would be no way to prove that they were making "decisions independently". One of the advantages of decentralization that Buterin claims is:
it is much harder for participants in decentralized systems to collude to act in ways that benefit them at the expense of other participants, whereas the leaderships of corporations and governments collude in ways that benefit themselves but harm less well-coordinated citizens, customers, employees and the general public all the time.
But this is only the case if in fact "the game consists of many small actors that make decisions independently" and they are "anonymous entities" so that it is hard for the leader of a conspiracy to find conspirators to recruit via off-chain communication. Alas, the last part isn't true for blockchains like Ethereum that support "smart contracts", as Philip Daian et al's On-Chain Vote Buying and the Rise of Dark DAOs shows that "smart contracts" also provide for untraceable on-chain collusion in which the parties are mutually pseudonymous.

Questions

If we want the advantages of permissionless, decentralized systems in the real world, we need answers to these questions:
  • What is a viable business model for participation that has decreasing returns to scale?
  • How can Sybil attacks be prevented other than by imposing massive costs?
  • How can collusion between supposedly independent nodes be prevented?
  • What software development and deployment model prevents a monoculture emerging?
  • Does federation provide the upsides of decentralization without the downsides?
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One Minute Park

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virtually spend 60 seconds in a random park or add your own to the growing collection #
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Texas Active Club Leader Blurred His Face But Forgot to Scrub His Socials

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This report was published in partnership with the Texas Observer.

The Texas Observer and Bellingcat have identified the leader of a white nationalist group that distributed antisemitic and racist flyers in Weatherford, Mineral Wells, and Eagle Pass, three small Texas cities, over the last year. In an online conversation with the Observer, Rhett Murry Loftis, a 23-year-old resident of Weatherford, admits he leads the Parker County Active Club. 

“I’m a fascist, there’s no denying that,” Loftis said in a series of direct messages

Loftis, a former musician, said he first got active in the white nationalist movement in 2021 after spending several years lurking in online forums. In April 2023, Loftis formed the Parker County Active Club, which he described as a “white nationalist fight club.” Loftis also admitted that he organises white nationalist activism under the name of the Texas Nationalist Network.

Parker County is located in the Dallas–Fort Worth metroplex in north central Texas and, in addition to the county seat Weatherford, contains parts of Mineral Wells and Fort Worth. The local Active Club is part of a decentralised network of “Active Clubs” that has spread across the United States and the global since 2020.

Described by the Southern Poverty Law Center as among the nation’s most active white nationalist groups, they use a combination of online propaganda, martial arts training, in-person gatherings, and small-scale demonstrations to drive recruitment and create new clubs. Bellingcat has previously reported on their presence in California and the Netherlands.

Screenshot of the Parker County Active Club’s Telegram description.

Jared Holt, a researcher at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, a think tank focused on extremism and human rights, said these white supremacist clubs “are increasingly organised and resourced and could pose even greater threats to public safety and community wellbeing in the immediate future.”

Like other Active Clubs, the one in Parker County promotes white nationalist and neo-Nazi ideology, such as the “Great Replacement Theory” and the white genocide theory, which proclaim the Jewish population and non-white immigrants pose an existential threat to the white race. Posts from the group’s Telegram chatroom quote Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. Videos show members making stiff-arm salutes. 

Loftis told the Observer that he does not identify as neo-Nazi. But he acknowledged he collaborates with them.

“Although I believe some form of Fascism is the answer, National Socialism is not that,” Loftis said. “I do admire Hitler and I believe the Roman salute is a powerful symbol of White power….One of my main passions is to help facilitate cooperation and collaboration between various pro-White groups.”

The two active clubs in Texas, the Parker County Active Club and the Alamo Active Club, gathered for demonstrations outside the state Capitol in Austin in 2023 and somewhere near San Antonio in 2024, according to posts in their Telegram channels. Although the number of Texas members is unclear, photos and videos indicate that at least a dozen young men are involved.

Image of Active Club members outside the Texas state Capitol in Austin, sometime in December 2023 (Telegram)

While Texas Active Clubs have maintained a relatively low profile, Tennessee Active Club members made national headlines last year when they acted as security for a controversial right-wing mayoral candidate who was arrested on charges of promoting prostitution in the mid-1990s in Dallas. Researchers have expressed growing concern about the growth of this extremist network.

Photos and videos in the Parker County Active Club chatroom document overlap with other white nationalist groups, including Patriot Front, the White Lives Matter movement, and the Goyim Defense League. One video shows Loftis distributing antisemitic flyers with members of the Goyim Defense League whom the Observer identified in prior reporting

“Active Clubs can best be understood as modern-day skinheads, as they often engage in the same networks, activities, and ideologies,” Holt said. “They are wearing a very thin veil, but I worry it might just be enough that it’s left some people confused as to what is going on here. This is the same old hate with a new wig and makeup.”

One of the earliest posts in the Parker County Active Club chatroom emphasised the importance of maintaining good operational security and not revealing identifying information. 

Loftis was confirmed to be the leader of the Parker County Active Club by the Observer and Bellingcat because of social media posts, images, and music he shared online. 

Our investigation began with a pseudonymous account on X. The account bio read: “Leader of Parker County Active Club” and “Founder and Co-Director of Texas Nationalist Network.”


We noted the profile photo featured a man with a blurred face and a prominent chest tattoo, which is seen in other photos posted in the Parker County Active Club’s Telegram channel. The handle of the X account, AtlasKhan69, was an initial clue and searching for the username revealed the Spotify page for Loftis’ former musical group, Atlas Khan. Writing credits for the group’s albums on Spotify revealed the name Rhett Loftis. 


Credits for Atlas Khan’s music on Spotify mention Atlas Collective, an umbrella brand for Loftis’ musical projects.  The Atlas Collective YouTube channel features Atlas Khan and other bands that also credited Loftis as a member.

Screen capture of Atlas Collective YouTube page.

In a 2022 podcast interview found on Spotify, Loftis spoke about his involvement with these bands and his time living in Parker County. One of the videos on the Atlas Collective YouTube channel featured a band photo that shows Loftis with a chest tattoo peeking out of the collar of his shirt that matches one seen in anonymised photos in the Parker County Active Club chatroom and in the profile photo of the pseudonymous X account.

Screen capture of a YouTube video featuring Loftis as a member of the band Muay Thai, faces obscured by Bellingcat.

After we contacted Loftis for comment, the X account’s handle was changed to “MrTedWilson,” which matches the username of a Telegram account under the name “Ted Wilson” that regularly posts in the Parker County Active Club’s channel.

Another uncensored photo of Loftis was found on a Quora account profile associated with his name, where Loftis asked questions about joining the Navy. A suspended account on Reddit named TheAtlasKhan posed similar questions about joining the Navy, talked about living in Parker County, and expressed racist and misogynistic views. 

Loftis initially denied owning the Reddit account, and then replied “can’t believe someone out there has the same tattoo as me…there’s a lot of Atlas Khans in Parker county I’m told” when asked about specific posts. “I mean come on bro you don’t need me to confirm everything… I think you’re doing a pretty good job digging on your own.”

The account mentioned in several posts or comments his difficulty producing a urine sample during an entrance processing test for military service. “Bro what helped me seriously is having a very trusted friend stand right behind when I piss,” one comment reads.

Many posts and videos in the Parker County Active Club Telegram chat room feature Loftis, whose face was typically blurred but who was identifiable due to his distinctive tattoos. Loftis’ face and arm tattoos are visible in one video documenting the distribution of antisemitic flyers, while his hand tattoo, which reads “Muay Thai” after the name of another of Loftis’s previous bands,  identifies him in another.  (The Reddit account TheAtlasKhan also refers in one comment to a tattoo of “my bands big fat logo on my left hand”.)

Images and video frames uploaded to Loftis’s Telegram account and the Parker County Active Club Telegram channel showing Loftis’s hand and arm tattoos. Symbol obscured by Bellingcat.

Tying all of this together was a Redbubble web store for merchandise affiliated with Loftis’ musical groups that also sold Parker County Active Club and Texas Nationalist Network shirts, including one featuring the same logo Loftis is wearing in profile photos of other accounts tied to his name, including a PayPal account. The store was deleted shortly after the Observer contacted Redbubble for comment.

“The user and listings in question violate our content guidelines and have been removed from the marketplace,” Redbubble said in a statement. 

 

The profile photo for Loftis’ PayPal account also appears to have been taken at the same time and place as another photo of Loftis that was posted on Telegram in September 2023. In both images, a man wearing a black shirt showing a Texas-themed design with Nazi iconography and bottoms with a camouflage pattern, stands in front of the same car, with an identical pickup truck in the background in both images as well. In the PayPal account image, Loftis’ tattoos are blurred.

According to a 2022 podcast interview, Loftis said he worked at Texas Steel Tech, a steel fabrication and construction company in Weatherford. Requests for comment to the company by email and phone about whether the white nationalist fight club leader is still employed there went unanswered. However, an email from Jason Lee Van Dyke, the Texas-based former Proud Boy leader and current lawyer for several Patriot Front members who hosted members of the white nationalist group at his property, inadvertently confirmed that Loftis is still employed at Texas Steel Tech.

“I received a telephone call from Mr. Loftis today,” Van Dyke wrote. “I am writing to ask you to please leave Mr. Loftis alone…you reached out to his employer.”

In a direct message conversation on X, Loftis subsequently confirmed that his employer had been contacted. He then deleted the account.


Tristan Lee and Michael Colborne contributed research.

Bellingcat is a non-profit and the ability to carry out our work is dependent on the kind support of individual donors. If you would like to support our work, you can do so here. You can also subscribe to our Patreon channel here. Subscribe to our Newsletter and follow us on Instagram here, X here and Mastodon here.

The post Texas Active Club Leader Blurred His Face But Forgot to Scrub His Socials appeared first on bellingcat.

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BigMoneySF: Explore the major players paying out to remake San Francisco

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San Francisco political advocacy network map.

“After rocking, my next favorite activity right now is San Francisco politics,” wrote developer Nick Podell in 2022, praising advocacy efforts during the city’s contentious redistricting saga. “For the first […]

BigMoneySF: Explore the major players paying out to remake San Francisco

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coinin:paulgadzikowski:Having read bits of that recent interview with the author...

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coinin:

paulgadzikowski:

Having read bits of that recent interview with the author who uses ChatGPT to “write” I gotta say it sounds like she’s using it to avoid writing, soooo….. this thesis checks out.

Article in question: https://www.theverge.com/c/23194235/ai-fiction-writing-amazon-kindle-sudowrite-jasper

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The business of check cashing

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The business of check cashing

Happy 2024! I had been hoping to have a year-in-review for 2023 ready by now, but a combination of illness and travel bushwacked me in January. So instead of that, we’ll go with regular programming for today and return to that later.

Brief housekeeping notes: one, if you like BAM, you’ll enjoy an interview I did with Tyler Cowen. Two, I’m sketching out the year both for BAM and other professional commitments, and am shooting for the same 20-26 issues that I was shooting for in 2023. This year I do not plan on my family again immigrating to America, which crushed my productivity in summer and lead to not hitting that forecast in 2023. As always, if you have comments or concerns, the inbox is open.

Check cashing

One of the reasons I covered the checks as a payment method recently was to lay the groundwork for talking about some of the fascinating alternative financial world around them. In the main, this helps people at the socioeconomic margins turn payroll and other checks into cash (or otherwise immediately spendable value) in return for a fee. This is not how you, reader, probably deal with checks, and the existence of this industry / product have been controversial for many years.

Hopefully you’ll soon understand why, and why it persists in existing and its customers persist in using it.

A note at the top: check cashing is distinct from payday loans, despite overlapping customer bases, overlapping retail presences, and the centrality of checks to both enterprises.

An oversimplified explanation of check presentment

In an ideal world I would have one essay already covering the nitty-gritty of check presentment but I don’t and so we will here do the handwavy version.

Pretend you are a banked individual, which in the U.S. context means that you have a checking account in your own name trivially available to you. You are handed a physical check. You would prefer to have money. What do you do?

You deposit it with your bank, naturally. This could be at the teller window, through the ATM, or (most likely if you’re reading an essay about financial infrastructure) through the “remote deposit capture” feature of your bank’s mobile app. You might not know it by that specialized name, and instead think “I use my iPhone to take a picture of the check then money shows up.”

Regardless of how you send the check to the bank, the next process is the same: the bank will make an electronic copy of the check, which is exactly the same legally as the check. This was made possible about twenty years ago by the Check 21 Act. Your bank will then electronically communicate that copy to the bank the check is drawn on (i.e. the bank whose routing number is printed on the bottom of the check).

That bank will, generally speaking, pay your bank money on the next business day. I will be intentionally handwavy here as to how, since the miracle that is net settlement is not the focus of this essay. Just assume that money magically arrives tomorrow.

Now, if you’ve paid attention when cashing checks over your lifetime, you may notice some confusion here. It is highly likely that you’ve waited for longer than one business day to receive funds from a check before. It is also likely that many of you recall at times not waitingat all; you received either full or partial credit for the check the same day you deposited it. What is up with this discrepancy?

A full discussion of Regulation CC, the Expedited Funds Availability Act, and banks’ sliding scale of willingness to be accommodating will have to wait for another BAM. Instead, let’s focus on the most fundamental issue.

Depositing a check requires an extension of credit

As we’ve previously discussed, all a payment ever has been is a message about the status of a debt with some level of certainty associated with it. A check is a specially formatted message. The “movement” of money tomorrow is another message. But neither of those messages encode absolute certainty that the payer is certainly discharging their debt to the payee.

If something goes wrong in this process—the overwhelmingly most likely one is that the payer doesn’t have the funds to cover the check (NSF, or “insufficient funds”), but the check being fraudulent or unauthorized is also possible—that wrongness may not be discovered before money “moves” to your bank. And so that payment can be recalled from your bank to the bank the check is drawn on. This will likely result in the bank attempting to recall the money from your account.

And so by presenting your check, which you think is substantially terminating a transaction, you are actually creating a new credit extension with your bank. They are extremely aware that you just asked them to advance you money, even if you are not aware that you did that. They already partially underwrote this extension of credit; that is why you were not shooed out of the building when you originally asked for a checking account.

And note that this credit relationship has two sources of risk. One is with the check writer: is that check going to “bounce” (be returned as NSF) after presentment? One is with the check payee: if the bank attempts to recover a bounced check from their customer, will that customer make the bank whole?

If you are banked in the United States, that means that a profit-maximizing institution looked at you and said “In expectation, almost all checks this person presents will be good, drawn legitimately on the accounts of individuals or firms who do not make a habit of bouncing checks. Of the tiny, tiny number of checks that this person deposits that will bounce, and honestly it will probably be zero over the lifetime of their account, we have high confidence that they will make us whole. They have credit here.”

There exist a variety of ways to be unbanked in the United States. One, which is socially awkward for advocates to take explicit notice of, is that a bank could look at a seeker of credit and say “Actually, in expectation, checks you present to us have a much-higher-than-baseline risk of bouncing. When they bounce, and our best estimate is you’ll bounce multiple times per year, our desired outcome is you make us whole and pay a modest penalty under our agreement. We assess that you present a material risk of not doing this. You might have gotten an A for 92% in school but if your checks are 92% likely to be good money that’s a hard no from us. We decline to extend you credit under this product. We may extend you credit in other fashions, if you ask. You’ll find that in those products credit costs a lot more than the cheap credit embedded in checking accounts, reflecting the elevated risk of doing business with you.”

Advocates at this point often call the banks racist, classist, and stupid.

Let’s pretend you asked decisionmakers in deposit franchises for their point of view here. They’d be happy to tell you. It would rhyme with this:

You know, we have been in this game for decades, and like to think we are pretty good at it. We did not make up that estimate of creditworthiness. We most definitely did not engage in illegal discriminatory practices, like inferring creditworthiness from zip code. We know that would be extremely probative data if we were allowed to use it, because we’re in the data and math business and good at our jobs, but egads. Can you imagine the fines we’d pay? The headlines? Compliance keeps a file to scare young analysts with. No, we paid a few dollars to get a report from ChexSystems, which said that the literal same person who wants us to extend credit ripped off the bank down the street for $450 a few months ago. If you were in consumer banking, and you’re not because we are having this discussion, you would recognize that as multiple years of the contribution margin of a checking account relationship. Do you want to extend them credit? Then bon chance. We decline.

That is certainly not the only pathway to being non-banked, but it is an extremely common one. Often, consumers self-select out because they try banking for a while and then repeatedly get assessed high fees which they do not feel are legitimate, such as fees for overdrafting their accounts. To bang a very old drum, the decision to move from everyone-pays-a-Netflix-subscription-for-banking to banking-is-free-except-we-assess-high-fees-if-you-screw-up created winners and losers. We called that one "free checking." Descriptively it subsidizes the middle class by using fees assessed stochastically to people in persistent economic precarity. In particular, young members of the middle class (college students and recent graduates in their least-well-off years) benefitted a lot.

So let's look at something that recent college grads very rarely encounter.

How cashing a check works if you’re not banked

You begin with a physical check. You generally physically walk it into a local business, which in Chicago are most commonly “currency exchanges” but which can in principle be done in many businesses known by many names (much like e.g. Western Union transfers). You ask to cash it. You speak to a clerk with a high school education, who likely remembers you from previous interactions. The clerk asks you to endorse the check, a ritual we’ll return to in a moment. She swiftly pays you cash from a drawer and retains the physical check. She offers you a receipt, and you do with it exactly what you do with a receipt from McDonalds. 

The cash does not match the value printed on the check. The fee you were charged is prominently disclosed on the receipt, on the wall, and in printed material you are passively offered but do not take, for the same reason that you’ve never walked home with a McDonalds menu.

That pricing grid looks something like this:

Check Type Fee Below $100 Fee Above $100
Public assistance 1.50% 1.50%
Government check (e.g., EITC*) 2.40% + $1 2.33%
Printed paycheck 2.40% + $1 2.33%
Personal check 2.45% + $1 3.00%
All other 2.40% + $1 2.40%

A brief aside about endorsement

Apologies to non-Americans who are wondering whether they’ve wandered into Westeros, with clearly medieval payment methods plus a likelihood of being beset by monsters, but let me explain a traditional ritual of our people.

The reverse of a check contains a small area where you can “endorse” the check. This means signing it and optionally leaving the bank an instruction as to what to do with the check. This is established by a combination of law and ancient practice.

One common endorsement historically is that you can endorse a check to another person, i.e. instruct the bank to make payment to the person you nominate, not to you. This enabled many use cases back in the day. A family might have two people earning wages but only one with title to a bank account; the second could endorse their wages to the first. A business could endorse a payment made by a customer to the business’ owner or to an employee or to a supplier. A common endorsement was simply “pay to cash.” (Banks hate that one and mostly don’t offer it any more. You can probably predict why.)

The practice of why endorsing is why check cashing can exist as a business, because you can endorse your check to the check casher. As of that moment, by the magic that is the U.S. legal system, your payer no longer owes you money; they now owe the check casher money. The now-endorsed check instructs the check casher’s bank and the payer’s bank to cooperate to make this side agreement happen.

As long as we are on this tangent, have you ever written “For mobile deposit only at Your Bank Goes Here”? Wondered why?

This is to prevent an annoying fraud vector where someone takes a legitimate check and then deposits it roughly simultaneously at multiple banks. Each bank will come to the conclusion it is a legitimate check (because it is) paid to someone with an account with them (true as it goes). Then they will begin the process of crediting their customer. Only at some later point will it be discovered that the check was presented multiple times. If the actor is good at being bad, they can use this to extract money from the victim banks. Asking you to endorse the check in the above fashion spoils it for future fraudulent use at other banks. And there, now you know why you are subjected to a minor annoyance.

This is also why the app/bank can’t do this for you. They need you to physically spoil the specimen that only you have and prove you did so (with a photo of the endorsement).

Many people hate check cashing and everything about it

If you are reading this, you probably are relatively wealthy, are almost certainly of high socioeconomic status, and quite plausibly have never paid one red cent for check cashing in your entire life.

But that check cashing business exists, basically entirely, to siphon a small amount of dollars off of thousands of relatively poor people. It can’t make the math work any other way. Every time you see a currency exchange when driving around town, you can be safe in the knowledge that there were thousands of poor people paying the vig last month and the owner expects most of them to pay the vig this month, too.

Most of the customers of that check business are not in a position where they can afford to be indifferent to $9. And yet the check cashing business will rake the first $9 out of their monthly public benefits payments. Or it will take their wages for the first hour of every pay period at McDonalds. Or it will insist that, when the homeowner whose lawn was mowed by an immigrant offers a $100 Christmas bonus, that Scrooge must get his $3 first.

Advocates hate this business model with a passion unmatched by ten thousand burning suns. They like to quote statistics like “[t]he average unbanked worker in Illinois spends $574 a year to cash their payroll checks.” (I am not relaying this quote for its truth value.)

There exists a deep academic literature about the unbanked and underbanked, much of it written by scholars who are self-consciously advocates. They have the same degree of neutrality on the merits that historians of the Civil Rights movement have on Jim Crow. That is to say, their disdain oozes from the page.

Personally, I would not attempt to dissuade anyone from their aesthetic feelings with respect to this business model. That would not be a good use of anyone’s time.

Do I hate this business and everything about it? Eh, I hate poverty, certainly. Almost everything poverty touches will have terrible elements about it, because the definition of poverty is terribleness caused by scarcity. If you can’t find the terrible, you’ve either left poverty behind or you're not looking very hard.

And, not to put too fine a point on it, it’s really hard to expressively, passionately hate this business and not hate the young lady working in it, the decisions and life challenges of its customers, and similar. And if you hate one particular building in a poor neighborhood, and then start rigorously thinking about the liquor store, or the police station, or the supermarket, or the church, or the public school, or the home in the poor neighborhood, I think your mind will start going to some pretty dark places.

So maybe let’s move past the aesthetic revulsion, which you’re entirely welcome to, and just look at what is going on here.

The internal logic behind that pricing grid

There exist two sources of credit risk in cashing a check, as we covered earlier. The pricing grid directly prices credit risk for the payer of the check, via bucketing them. It is not the most discerning risk analysis ever conducted in the financial industry, because you need to be able to explain it to extremely unsophisticated customers and only barely more sophisticated staff.

The world’s financial system is predicated on the U.S. government being definitionally zero credit risk when denominated in dollars. Every other kind of debt in the world is defined in reference to a Treasury.

A portion of the price of every cell in that pricing grid is credit risk. Just like the spread between a bond and a Treasury of the same duration is a reflection of marginal riskiness, the spread between personal checks and government checks is a reflection of “the credit risk of the types of people who most commonly write checks to poor people.”

As you can see, by simple subtraction, this spread is non-zero but low.

Now what causes the price to be so hard high for the reference risk? Well, Treasuries certainly pay out to someone, but not everyone in the world who says they own $1 million in Treasuries actually does. Government checks don't have credit risk directly, they have operational risk which becomes a credit risk. In the case where either the person cashing them isn't the person named on the check, or where the government later comes to the conclusion that it didn't really want to pay them, that money could (at some risk) be clawed back from the bank, and therefore from the check casher.

It is also useful to understand that the consumer of this service is not solely paying for credit risk. A consumer of hamburgers at McDonalds is not solely paying for processed meat product. The physical storefront the transaction is conducted in pays commercial rent (in, given that this is a check cashing business, highly likely a low-rent area). The high school graduate who remembers you from last month, and who has many challenges of her own, wants a day’s wages for spending a day talking to poor people about money. Somewhere in the enterprise there exists a much more expensive professional who spent weeks of work writing up compliance procedures for a money services business, likely secured a license for the same, and then convinced a bank that it should accept the custom of one of the highest-risk legal businesses.

That bank does not cash the daily envelope of checks for free, either. It had a consequential commercial negotiation which took notice of the business’ risk profile, high operational costs associated with their custom, and the near certainty that they would be very annoying to work with. The bank ultimately quoted a price per check and, very likely, a minimum amount which would be assessed monthly.

How much? Eh, prices are prices. How much does a pound of potatoes cost? I don’t know. It depends on what kind of potato. It depends on where you live. It depends who you are buying the potato from. It depends an awful lot on whether you buy your potatoes by the pound or by the truckload or by the megaton. (Not an exaggeration if you are McDonald’s logistics system, right? Some check cashing businesses are owned by multi-state chains.)

But, as someone who has more professional experience with checks than with potatoes, if you twisted my arm I’d say “Indicatively, the bank charges 5 to 25 cents per check.”

Persistent identities as a KYC possibility

So we mentioned that there are two types of credit risk here, and how the payer credit risk is explicitly priced. How is the payee credit risk priced?

It isn’t. The check casher assumes that, as a first approximation, if a check bounces, they are going to lose money. Any other result is a windfall. Absorbing these credit losses is about 20% of the total costs of their check cashing operation.

That probably strikes you as pretty surprising, but if you earn $6 gross on a $200 transaction, and one out of every 250 checks bounces, well there you go. 40 bps default rate on 230 bps of revenue of which ~200 bps goes right back out the door.

The main procedural control for this that check cashers have is persistent identities. Your bank relies on a version of this, too, except in banking it is spelled KYC and is by regulation and practice excruciatingly formally documented. Many check cashing places will allow you to cash a check without having a government-issued ID, because many customers are from socioeconomic strata which routinely do not have a government-issued ID. Many check-cashing places will allow you to cash a check with a name which you are known by to the community but perhaps not what your teacher called out at roll call.

Some might take a picture of you the first time you do business with them. Some might simply rely on the social network and recollection of the young lady manning the cash register. Some will ask for and retain a copy of a government-issued ID or substitute paperwork, much like the DMV will. That could be a lease or utility bill or similar. Regardless, the purpose is the same: if you bounce a check, and you don’t pay it back, staff will be instructed that they don’t do business with this #(#%#($#)*$ anymore.

There are a spectrum of words that the staff and management could call you there, and none of them are phrased “defaulting customer” or appropriate for inclusion in this essay. All of them are, in fact, used at at least some establishments. As we’ve established, this is not a building in the part of town where people are ruthlessly socialized to not say really bad words about poor people. Compassion gets burned out of the owner and burned out of the clerk in basically the same ways that it gets burned out of everyone else in the neighborhood.

A brief discussion about class distinctions in America

One very real reason this type of business exists in the world is to be a firewall between social classes and the businesses that serve them. Check cashing establishments insulate banks, which are indispensable for cashing checks, from needing to talk to certain people.

A check cashing business is “alternative finance." It is alternative to the banking world of smartly dressed middle class employees, free coffee, and firm handshakes.

A check cashing clerk and a bank teller look to many to be similar jobs done by similar people and crucially they are not. Bank tellers do not make much money but know they must present as middle class. They work in a built environment where surveillance is absolutely ubiquitous and where deviant behavior (like using certain prescribed words) will have one referred to an alternative court system for swift and certain punishment.

That is to say: bank tellers work for an American corporation with an HR department. And bank tellers, in their hearts and in their actions, internalize the class that they must, must, must present as. There are classes of people that the bank does not want to do business with. (Banks are, as we have frequently covered, not allowed to say this in as many words.) The tellers do not want to speak to them, either, and this disdain radiates from them as palpable waves.

The clerk at a check cashing business is not a bank teller. She does not disdain talking to poor people; being able to do that in such a way that most poor people end up liking her is her job. Don’t take my word for it; take the customers’. We have studied this industry extensively. We ran surveys. The customers keep saying things like “I like my local check cashing place because the girl behind the counter is kind and doesn’t judge me like those #%*(#%( at the bank.” You can present as being kind to almost all of your customers and be obviously unemployable as a bank teller.

You will deal with thousands of customers. If you use “kind girl behind the counter” language about the 0.01% most aggravating customer once, you will not be a bank teller tomorrow. So bank tellers basically never use those words, and instead can inflect “Can I help you, sir?” in a way which leaves absolutely no doubt as to how welcome the new arrival to the branch is.

Then the economists running the survey typically scratch their heads and try to squeeze that feedback into homo economicus’ model of the world.

Readers might be thinking I am unnecessarily besmirching the good name of the field of economics here here, and so I will recount a representative sentence from a very good journal article verbatim:

To more effectively bring these unbanked individuals into the financial mainstream, it is essential for policymakers to recognize that these consumers have made these interdependent decisions in accordance with their marginal-cost-marginal-benefits calculations.

That is a lens of looking at reality, sure, and if you share that lens, you are welcome at my poker table any time. My marginal-cost-marginal-benefits calculations suggest your confidence in inferring ground truth from partial data is misplaced.

(Now you shouldn’t expect from me the level of academic rigor associated with scholars at e.g. Harvard; on the Internet, we cite our sources. That quote was originally published by the Chicago Fed and then the Review of Economics and Statistics. Full cite relegated to JSTOR for those interested. And again, as the literature in this field goes, that is a really strong entry. A particularly interesting finding is the relationship between being married and using check cashing businesses, which surprised me.)

Classes aren’t monoliths, of course. Many people assume you’d clearly never visit a currency exchange if you have a checking account. In time, the literature actually learned to ask that question and found that, decisively, no, some banked people do happily pay to cash checks. This observation caused some confusion. I am confused why this fact is confusing; some people who are capable of cooking have also been known to go to McDonalds, even though McDonalds isn’t free and doesn’t taste like a burger at home. That is, of course, one of the points of going to McDonalds.

Anyhow, if you want to dive deeper into that topic, look how various groups/papers/etc delineate between unbanked and underbanked. It will frequently come down to “Underbanked means you’re not unbanked but you still eat at McDonalds consume alternative financial services.” See this representative example.)

Check cashing on phones

So if we’ve identified the costs associated with retail establishments as one reason why check cashing costs money, and that many unbanked or underbanked customers do not have happy human interactions with financial service providers, you might wonder if technology can successfully cash checks while being cheaper and less judgemental about one’s presentation of class.

Yes, it can.

As always, I’m not endorsing any particular provider here, but let me point you towards a couple of models.

In one, a pure-play company like Ingo Money has both a direct-to-consumer offering and some ability to whitelabel it. (A whitelabel arrangement means that some other firm does the work of attracting the customers and then uses Ingo’s technology stack, financial rails, licenses, or any subset of the above to provide the check cashing service. To the customer, this feels a lot like they're "just" using the partner the whole time.) Ingo lets you essentially do remote deposit capture but instead of the deposit being to a bank account and there being a hold period, deposit is to an alternative financial product (like e.g. a prepaid card) and the funds are released basically instantly.

Take a look at Ingo’s fees and compare them to the representative fees for brick-and-mortar cash checking. For a $500 paycheck, it’s $5 versus $11.65 in favor of the app. This is the fintech dream; the delta is basically entirely “your costs are our margin.” Because the fintech nightmare is “our costs of customer acquisition explain why people still pay rent for commercial locations in high-traffic areas”, there is a loyalty program which gives steep discounts for repeated use.

And then there’s one decision which I just love aesthetically: if you’re willing to wait ten days, Ingo will discount your fee straight to zero. Why ten days? It is past the window where fraud discovery will result in the funds being clawed back plus (ahem) a bit of annoyance tacked on as a product decision.

I expect very few of their customers take them up on that. Most McDonalds burgers are not consumed by people who can cook a burger at home. They lack that capability; understanding this is an important part of understanding their life and the role of McDonalds in it. But free check cashing being available now where it wasn’t before is a straight-up win for the customers and the world.

Another model is embedding the check cashing into a larger suite of services. Cash App is a notable standout here (and, IMHO, probably the most interesting financial product the tech industry has created for the un-/underbanked.) On the backend, Cash App has simply convinced a bank to have a wider risk envelope as part of the price for working with a client who represents a very large portfolio of customers. The most useful thing Cash App can convince those users to do, which it spends substantial effort on doing, is signing up for direct deposit to their Cash App. (Really, it is to the partner bank, but from the user’s perspective eh it shows up in Cash App and all their friends use Cash App and you could turn it into actual paper money so does it really matter what some bank in Nebraska thinks? Nobody there will ever talk to you or talk down to you, so no.)

This is not, by itself, a full solution to the headaches implicit in banking people who are above average risk. You can read elsewhere about some of the implications.

There exist other models here, too, and other factors which are reducing need for this form of financial service. The continued march of direct deposit and earned wage access products keeps more of the wage pie in the pockets of workers, even those in diminished circumstances.

One useful thing the advocates (and others) accomplished over the last twenty years was convincing public benefits distributors to not solely use checks to distribute benefits. For example, "electronic benefit transfer" (EBT) replace the monthly check with a specialized variant of a pre-paid card which can be refilled. This sometimes results in the cost of distribution falling less on beneficiaries. Sometimes.

What do you want me to write about next?

The recent focus of checks has been a bit on the classical side of the financial industry and a bit depressing (see above). I’m eagerly accepting nominations for topics in 2024. Drop me an email or hit me up on Twitter (@patio11). As always, the writing calendar is driven by some combination of what people ask me about, what I find myself puzzling about on any given day, and what fills obvious holes in the Internet for the sort of people who’d read Bits about Money.

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williampietri
77 days ago
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